IT IS
Bretton Woods system, in fact at the center of the system. Bretton Woods and international monetary policy were not major concerns of the Federal Reserve however, despite the formal commitment to the system and the responsibility implied by the role of the dollar. The failure to honor the commitment is one part of the inflationary policies of that period. I am pleased to review and interpret the main facts about that experience in this lecture in honor of Homer Jones.
In the 45 years following World War II, there was a remarkable transformation of the international monetary system. At the war's end, the dollar was the dominant currency for international transactions and was universally held as a reserve asset or store of value. The Bretton Woods system recognized this role by making the dollar the principal reserve currency of the international system with the British pound as a second reserve currency. Exchange rates of other currencies were fixed to the dollar but were adjustable under conditions defined by the agreement. But, by 1971 the Bretton Woods system was in shambles, and in 1973 major countries agreed to experiment with fluctuating exchange rates. This paper is about the history of U.S. international economic policy under Bretton Woods from 1959 to 1973. The period begins with the recognition of a problem that was to become the central problem of the international monetary system for the next decade. At first, the problem was seen as a temporary balance of payments problem-the inability of the United States to balance its trade and payments at the prevailing fixed exchange rates. The end of this historical era is fixed by the decision in March 1973 to abandon fixed exchange rates between principal currencies. The starting point, 1959, is the year major currencies became convertible, subject in many cases to restrictions on capital movements that were increased or relaxed as reserve positions changed.
Soon after the start of the period, and at the end, policymakers expressed concern about the competitive position of the U.S. economy. This concern about competitiveness returns again and again in the next four decades, although the focus of concern and the principal manifestation of the alleged problem shift. The alleged cause in 1959-60 was trade discrimination, which had been accepted by the United States at the end of the war to assist in the recovery from wartime destruction abroad. Soon after, the costs of foreign assistance and foreign military expenditures were added as causes. By the late 1960s these concerns and concern about foreign investment led successive administrations to restrict payments to foreigners by means such as the interest equalization tax, taxes on tourist expenditures, "buy America" programs, and "temporary" controls of foreign investment. Inflationary financing of the war in Vietnam and of domestic social spending more than offset any effect these programs may have had on the equilibrium value of the fixed, nominal exchange rate. Increasingly, the problem came to be seen as an exchange rate problem, specifically an overvalued dollar. As the Bretton Woods system ended, the dollar was first devalued against gold and major currencies, then allowed to fluctuate.
In the U.S. system, principal responsibility for international economic policy rests with the Treasury. The Federal Reserve is formally of secondary importance. Under Bretton Woods the Federal Reserve's main responsibility was to conduct monetary policy so as to maintain the fixed exchange rate agreed to by the administration. There is no specific legislative authorization for the Federal Reserve to buy and sell foreign currencies (Schwartz 1991) . But the Federal Reserve had a larger, informal role. Officials and staff participated in international meetings, gave advice and counsel on what were seen to be the principal problems of the Bretton Wood system, and proposed solutions. They participated, as observers, at the regular meetings of the Bank for International Settlements, where central bankers held regular discussions and reviews of U.S. policies. There is little evidence, however, of any systematic effort by the Federal Reserve to conduct monetary policy in a manner consistent with the requirements of a fixed exchange rate system. And, there is no evidence that any of the administrations objected to this neglect. On the contrary, from the Kennedy to the Nixon administrations, domestic economic policy objectives, though frequently changed, were of overriding interest. 8 The Treasury also auctioned "strips" of bills that required dealers to buy more than one issue at a time on the implausible assumption that the additional distribution cost would be treated by the market as a rise in the effective interest rate instead of a fee for service. 
THE UNITED STATES IN THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM
The
Special Measures
From 1960 on, each administration sustained or strengthened controls on trade and payments intended to reduce the balance of payments deficit. 9 At first, the measures consisted of concern about profitable investment abroad puzzles me; investment of this kind produces a subsequent inflow. Also, the current account balance is more useful for comparison of the fixed and fluctuating rate periods On the role of the current account see Corden (1990) . Later, Switzerland joined the G-10, but the name remained.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
The United States supplied 60 percent of the gold sold in the London gold market; the other members of G-10 were supposed to provide the rest. Foreign countries replaced some of their sales by purchases from the United States, so the U.S. contribution to the pool, direct and indirect, became a major cause of the decline in the U.S. gold stock. In March 1968, with U.S. gold reserves under $11 billion, the gold pool was abandoned. The price of gold for official transactions remained at $35, but the G-10 governments did not attempt to control the price for private transactions. To prevent arbitrage, foreign central banks agreed not to sell in the gold market. requirements on foreign deposits in German banks that had been used to limit capital in-23 lbid., p. 32. 24 The mark had been revalued by 5 percent in 1961. Solomon (1982) , p. 162, reports the May 1969 statement given by a German official that the decision to not revalue was "final, unequivocal and for eternity." This is one of many strong denials during the period. Solomon (1982) gives a thorough account of the discussions, proposals and the meetings of various official groups. Solomon was a senior civil servant at the Federal Reserve with responsibility for international finance and an active participant or observer at most of the discussions. Reserve trade weights. 41 The figure shows the 41 The Federal Reserve uses shares of world trade to set individual country weights. The real interest rate index for foreign countries is based on Treasury bills for Canada and the United Kingdom and call money rates for Germany and Japan. The Federal Reserve trade weights are standardized for the four countries to sum to unity. Inflation is measured by the consumer price index for each country. The ratio shown uses three-month moving averages (not centered) for both series. The data on relative real rates of interest suggest that the Federal Reserve made little effort to slow or stop the capital flow. During the winter of 1971 relative real rates in the United States fell until March along with U.S. real rates, despite the large dollar outflow. The rise in relative rates in the spring and summer reflects both a decline in foreign rates and a rise in U.S. rates.
The gold and foreign exchange markets also give little evidence of a lack of confidence leading to a flight from the dollar during the 1960s. An exception is the winter of 1968 when the gold price rose and the two-tier market began. By 1969, the gold price in the free London market had fallen back to $35.2 per ounce. Tlu; same cannot be said for the other reserve currency, the pound sterling. By 1964, the pound was subject to market pressure; to devalue rela- Reserve did the opposite, the federal funds rate fell from a peak of 9 percent early in 1970 to 48 The official settlements balance measures the change in reserve assets minus the change in short-and long-term liabilities to foreign official institutions (central banks or international agencies). 54 More precisely, the surtax was used to raise import duties no higher than their statutory level from which tariff reductions had been made. For autos, the increase was therefore>6.5 percent (ERP, 1972, p. 148) . Shultz and Dam (1977) , p. 115 explain that the surcharge was to be used as a bargaining chip to keep other countries from followinq the U.S. devaluation against gold. U.S. policy was to devalue against gold and other currencies. The surcharqe raised the price of U.S. imports, so devalued the dollar against other currencies until they agreed to a formal devaluation.
"France adopted a dual exchange rate with financial transactions at a floating rate. declined by approximately 3 percent; between July and the end of December 1971 the rate fell an additional 6.5 percent, so real devaluation for the year was approximately 9.4 percent. Figure 7 shows the real exchange rate for the dollar against a trade-weighted basket of currencies using Federal Reserve weights. Since there are few parity changes prior to 1971, the real exchange rate reflects mainly relative price changes. Hence, figure 7 for the most part duplicates figure 3 until 1971. Thereafter, the two (•hai ts differ; the real exchange rate reflects both the devaluation of the nominal exchange rate and the change in relative prices.
What Next?
The price-wage freeze, the surtax on imports and the floating dollar were thought to be temporary measures. There is no evidence that the administration had developed a long-term program by August 15, but they began to do so.
The 1972 Economic Report summarizes some of their thinking by discussing three questions. Should realignment occur through market adjustment or negotiation? How large is the structural or permanent deficit? How should the reduction in the U.S. payments deficit be distributed among other trading countries? In practice, the distribution would be determined by the choice 61 See Solomon (1982), p. 192-93; ERP (1972) , p. 154. The $13 billion included a $6 billion surplus to provide for lending to developing countries. sion of trade barriers produced very few changes. (Solomon, 1982), p. 191. 63 See Solomon (1982) 
The Flaws in Bretton Woods
The designers of the Bretton Woods system wanted to reduce the role of gold and make ad-66 See the Wall Street Journal, December 19, 1971. 69See Pauls (1990) , p. 897-98. ^Previously Germany used reserve requirements on foreign ™| MF Yearbook (1990) deposits to reduce capital inflows. In June 1973 sales of German securities to foreigners were prohibited. 68 The Bundesbank purchased $5 billion in the week ending There is little reason to doubt that public opinion in many countries wanted to avoid a return to the gold standard. The gold standard was widely viewed as an excessively rigid, 19th century system. Some of the French, who favored a greater role for gold, emphasized the "discipline of gold" and the repayment of dollar and sterling 73 See Rueff (1969) . 74 There were many other private proposals including proposals for a world central bank. Haberler (1966) , p. 9
liabilities. 73 They wrote as if they did not want a more flexible system of adjustment; they wanted greater discipline. They talked much more about the losses on holdings of dollars than the gain from a more stable, adjustable monetary system. Although a return to a full gold standard was not the consistent aim of French policy toward the international monetary system, their proposals and arguments made it easy for others to dismiss their arguments. Neither France nor other governments offered alternative proposals under which U.S. monetary policy would be subject to discipline. 74 Perhaps it was inevitable in the 1960s that any alternative to U.S. policy would be dismissed.
The U.S. argument that the dollar could not be devalued was, at most, a half truth. The restrictions placed on various types of transactions were partial devaluations that changed the relative prices of those transactions. The most obvious example was the interest equalization tax which raised the cost of borrowing dollars. Import-export bank subsidies lowered the cost of favored U.S. exports. Other restrictions worked in much the same way to selectively devalue the dollar.
Some of the restrictions were so short-sighted as to raise doubts about the purpose of the policy and the objectives of the policymakers. Restrictions on investment abroad by U.S. firms are an obvious example. Absent the restrictions, investment abroad would have been higher and the capital outflow larger. But, profitable investment abroad would have produced a return flow, increasing the current account surplus in the future. Whatever short-term gain the restrictions achieved, they had long-term, negative consequences. The problem was not a shortterm problem of maintaining the Bretton Woods system for a few months or years. From a longer perspective the restrictions on investment were counter-productive. The interest equalization tax was no less shortsighted than the restrictions on investment. The effect of the tax was to raise the cost of trading in U.S. markets, thereby encouraging part of the financial service industry to move abroad. A long-term result was loss of the export of some financial services.
By far the major flaw in U.S. policy, and the most damaging feature of the Bretton Woods system, was the failure to prevent U.S. inflation. As the system developed, the United States was able to choose domestic over international goals whenever a choice had to be made. At times, particularly in the early 1960s, U.S. nominal interest rates were kept higher for a few weeks or months to reduce the capital outflow. But such choices usually were reversed if unemployment rose. U.S. policymakers typically chose expansion to deflation and used controls of various kinds to get temporary reductions in the capital outflow. And, after 1966, policymakers adopted more inflationary policies than before. Given the priority placed on employment and other domestic goods, such as housing, price stability was ruled out.
All of the responsibility for failure does not fall on the United States, Germany, Japan and others pursued export growth as a holy grail and either made few efforts to adjust their exchange rates or none at all. Spokesmen for Germany could point correctly to the inflationary policies of the United States, and the failure of the United States to adjust domestic policies so as to honor international commitments, but they were less forthright about the adjustment of countries with sustained surpluses that had undervalued currencies. 75 After the Bretton Woods experience, Germany changed its policies toward adjustment. In the European Monetary System, Germany revalued frequently to keep that system from experiencing the adjustment problems of Bretton Woods.
It is surprising how little attention was paid to the adjustment problem. The Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations did not propose a permanent solution. 76 Each so-called crisis left more controls on capital movements or other transactions, but these efforts were not followed by internal discussions of policies leading to a long-term solution in which controls would be removed. The Economic Reports of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon have lengthy sections each year on the international monetary system, but the reports say little about adjustment. The typical comment was that surplus countries should revalue or expand demand. The explanation for neglect of adjustment is not that such discussions were sensitive. Solomon (1982) reports on the many meetings that were held during these years. There are pages on proposals and negotiations about liquidity, very little discussion of adjustment. The G-10 and the International Monetary Fund are no better. 77 They, too, avoided the issue or limited their comments to suggestions that surplus countries expand without inflating. Even the devaluations by Britain and France were not followed by discussions of the effect of the devaluation on the United States.
As the Bretton Woods system developed, it acquired some of the characteristics its designers had hoped to avoid. Major countries were reluctant to change parities. Surplus countries argued that adjustment was the responsibility of deficit countries. Deficit countries made opposite arguments, appealing to the need for symmetry.
The 1960s witnessed the beginning of efforts to solve international monetary or economic problems by coordinating policy actions. In practice, this usually meant that surplus and deficit countries were supposed to agree on different mixes of monetary and fiscal policy actions. Discussions produced few concrete steps. Foreign countries accepted the expansions implied by the flows of U.S. dollars, but they did not systematically reduce government spending or raise taxes to slow their expansions and lower domestic interest rates. And, as discussed earlier, the United States focused mainly on domestic 75 See Emminger (1967) 
